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Abstract: In recent years, we have continually encountered multimedia files in daily life, as evidence in courts, medical
records in hospitals, etc. Many multimedia-editing software tools have been developed in parallel to the widespread
usage of multimedia files. Thus, forgery operations can be committed by anyone with this software, even if s/he does
not have any skill in this field. Authentication of the originality of multimedia files has recently become a popular
topic. In this work, we propose a new video forgery detection approach to detect forged frames with better execution
and detection capability. Features are extracted from the frames and their correlations are represented as a correlation
image. This method investigates a line on the correlation image to determine the forgery operation. Then two new
procedures (shrinking/expanding) are applied to the detected line to determine the exact location of the forgery. The
experimental results indicate that the proposed method can detect forgery operations with better execution time and
detection capability when compared to similar works in the literature.
Key words: Video forensic, video forgery detection, copy–move forgery, video processing

1. Introduction
The development of many easy-to-use multimedia editing tools renders the authenticity of the multimedia files
susceptible. Ensuring their authenticity is important, because they are used in all areas of life such as in
medical systems, military communications, or as evidence in court. Thus, developing new techniques to ensure
the originality of the multimedia files has become an active research topic because of their susceptibility.
In recent years, many techniques have been proposed to authenticate image files, and their number is
increasing every year. On the other hand, even if the video forgery detection problem has drawn the attention
of researchers, only a limited amount of work has been realized in this area compared to the image forgery
detection problem.
The techniques that determine the originality of the video files can be categorized into two types: active
and passive methods. Active methods, known as “video watermarking techniques”, embed specially created
information into the video to authenticate it later. Therefore, they necessitate specially equipped hardware to
embed information during the capturing operation, or specially written software after the capturing process.
However, passive methods only use statistical information about the video file to determine the forgery process.
These draw more attention from researchers due to their easy applicability.
Forgery operations on the videos can be grouped into two categories: frame-based forgery and regionbased forgery. In the first category, the malicious user can modify a video by using several of the following
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operations: insertion of frames from another video, deletion of frames, replacement of frames from another
video, replacement of frames from the same video, or insertion of frames from the same video. The second
category contains forgery operations, which copy a region on the frame and paste it onto another region on the
same frame. The methods proposed for “copy–move forgery detection on images” can be used to detect the
second type of forgery operation in the videos. However, detection of forgery operations in the first category
is harder and necessitates added eﬀort from researchers. In this work, we focus on two forgery operations:
replacement of frames and insertion of frames from the same video, which we call ‘frame duplication’, as in the
literature.
Frame duplication modification can be used to remove scenes from the video or replicate them. Two
examples of these scenarios are given below.
• A person can read a secret document in a room that is monitored by cameras. Camera records can
be viewed by a particular person at a specific time each day. A malicious person can modify records,
indicating that s/he has not read any documents in that room, by replacing the frames that accommodate
him/her with ones that do not.
• A gun is actually fired one time in the original record. A malicious user can modify it so that the gun is
fired twice.
Figure 1 contains an example of frame duplication forgery. Figure 1a contains original frame sequences, whereas
Figure 1b indicates the forged version of this sequence. The man in the forged video sequence leaves the elevator
twice.
Wang et al. proposed the first method in the literature, which uses temporal correlation matrices to
detect frame duplication forgery [1]. Their work divides the entire video into overlapping subsequences and
calculates correlation matrices from the subsequences. If any two matrices correlate, the method assumes that
corresponding subsequences are a candidate for frame duplication. In the second phase of the algorithm, spatial
correlation matrices are created among these candidate subsequences to decide the exact forgery. Following this
work, many techniques have been proposed to detect frame duplication forgery, and their details are given in
Section 2.
The methods in the literature aim to improve two factors: detection accuracy and runtime performance.
If a method attempts to improve detection accuracy, it is possible to be aﬀected by time complexity. In this
work, we aim to improve detection accuracy with better runtime. The experimental data set is created from
a set of compressed videos to render the method more realistic. The proposed method creates a correlation
image from the feature vectors, which represent corresponding frames. The correlation image accommodates
lines with a slope of –45 ◦ , referred to as forgery lines, if any forgery operation has been applied on the current
test video. The method utilizes a line detection algorithm to determine the location of the forgery line. Then
shrinking/expanding algorithms are applied to the forgery line to determine the exact location of the forgery
(integer valued points on the line correspond to the indexes of the copied and pasted frames) on the test video.
The outline of the algorithm can be summarized as follows.
The proposed method divides the test video into frames, and partitions each frame into nonoverlapping
12 × 12 sub-blocks. It applies discrete cosine transform (DCT) to each sub-block at each frame and transforms
them into the frequency domain. Average DCT value for each sub-block is calculated, and a row vector is
obtained from each frame that contains averaged DCT values. The obtained row vectors for each frame are
then binarized. The proposed method calculates a correlation matrix from binary row vectors and creates a
correlation image for the current test video. Brighter pixels in the correlation image denote similar frames. If
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Figure 1. Frame duplication examples: a) original video image, b) forgery video images.

some frames in the video are copied and pasted into another point, the correlation image will accommodate a
line with slope of –45 ◦ , called forgery line. The proposed method applies the Hough transform to the correlation
image to find such a line, and then applies exact localization procedure to it to detect the correct location of the
forgery operation. Exact localization procedure investigates the neighboring lines and then decides the exact
location of the forgery line. Furthermore, the method applies the shrinking/expanding approach on the forgery
line to eliminate false matches. Experimental results show that the proposed method gives better detection
accuracy with improved run time when compared to similar works in the literature [1–4].
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Although the average detection accuracy for the method is approximately 0.99 s, the others show
approximately 0.59, 0.79, 0.85, and 0.87 s, respectively [1–4]. The method processes a frame in 0.07 s when
average run time is considered. The run time durations for other methods are approximately 294.67, 140.6,
0.41, and 0.063 s, respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related works for frame duplication detection. The
outline of the proposed method is given in Section 3, and Section 4 contains experimental results. Conclusions
are given in the last section.
2. Related work
The works in the literature can be grouped into three categories according to their goals [5]. The methods in
the first category aim to detect forgery operations by using traces of double or multiple compression, because
the malicious user must resave the forged video after the tampering operation.
Wang and Farid proposed the first work in this category in 2006 [6]. Their work showed that a forgery
operation leaves some artifacts on static and temporal statistical perturbations. In 2009, the authors used
the double quantization eﬀect, which is the result of double MPEG compression, to detect forgery operations
[7]. Their technique can detect tampered regions even if their size is as small as 16 × 16 pixels. Sun et al.
indicated that double compression explains the violation on the parametric law for first-digit distribution of
alternating current (AC) coeﬃcients [8]. Their method extracts a feature vector with a size of 1 × 12 from
each group of pictures (GOP), and the original bit rate scale is estimated by using a support vector machine
(SVM). Vazquez-Padin et al. introduced a new footprint to detect forgery operation [9]. Their technique used a
variation of the macroblock prediction types in the re-encoded P frames. However, their algorithm only works
with a fixed-size GOP. Jiang et al. modeled first-order Markov statistics on the DCT coeﬃcients [10]. Their
results showed better results compared to other works, even if the first quality scale is a divisor of a second
quality scale. Huang et al. emphasized that the number of diﬀerent coeﬃcients between the I-frames of singly
and doubly compressed MPEG-2 videos is larger than doubly and triply compressed MPEG-2 videos [11].
The methods in the second category deal with “region-based forgery”, which copies a region of the frame
and pastes it onto another region on the same frame or other ones, to hide or replicate a region. In 2007, Wang
and Farid showed that spatial and temporal correlations of the deinterlacing algorithms could be disturbed due
to the tampering operation [12]. Their results showed that the method can localize tampering in a spatial and
temporal domain. Li et al. extracted motion information from the frames to apply the block-based motion
estimation method [13]. Orientation and gradient information of the motion vectors was used to determine
the forged regions. Hsu et al. modeled the distribution of correlation of temporal noise residue as a Gaussian
mixture model [14]. The block-level correlation of noise residue was used to localize the regions tampered with
by the algorithm. In 2015, Su et al. proposed a method based on compressive sensing to detect a specific
forgery type: moving foreground was removed from the background [15]. Their method utilized k-singular
value decomposition (k-SVD) to obtain the features of the diﬀerence between the frames. The algorithm that
projects the features onto a smaller subspace uses k-means as well. However, the method only works with
static background videos. Bidokhti et al. proposed a method that divides each frame in a video sequence
into suspicious and remaining areas [16]. An optical flow coeﬃcient is calculated for each part, and abnormal
condition on the optical flow coeﬃcient designates the forgery operation.
The methods in the third category are used to detect “frame-based forgery”. In 2011, Lin et al. divided the
video into subsequences and calculated color histogram diﬀerence over them [2]. The correlation of histograms
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for any subsequences indicates the forgery operation in a coarser manner. Additionally, their method employs
the block-based approach on the candidate subsequences to determine the exact location of the forgery. In [17],
the authors showed that optical flow in the X and Y direction of adjacent frames is consistent for nontampered
videos. Frame-based forgery will destroy the optical flow, as can be seen in their results. This method divides
the video into subsequences and calculates the optical flow in each subsequence. Optical flow is thresholded,
and binary search is applied according to the result of the thresholding operation to determine the forgery point.
However, their method gives better results when the inserted frame has a diﬀerent background scene, resulting
from obvious forgery operation. The method in [18] processes the video frame-by-frame and divides each frame
into four sub-blocks. Nine features are used to represent each frame and lexicographical sort is applied to group
the similar frames. Root mean square error (RMSE) is calculated for neighboring frames’ feature vectors to
determine the forgery. However, compression decreases the performance of their method, because it works with
correlation. In [3], Yang et al. used singular value decomposition (SVD) to extract features from the frames.
Then the Euclidean distance between each frame and the reference frame, which is the first frame of the video,
is calculated to determine temporal similarity. Additionally, the authors investigate similar clips with random
block matching.
3. Proposed method
In this section, we give a detailed outline of the proposed method. The main challenges considered in the
literature are the running time of the detection process and detection accuracy of the method. We aim to
propose a new approach to enhance these two factors in the frame duplication detection problem. Our work
proposes three new algorithms, namely “correlation image generation”, “coarser forgery line detection”, and
“finer forgery line localization”, to ensure better detection performance and lower execution time. The details
of these algorithms are given in the following subsections.
A general outline of the proposed method is presented in Figure 2.
Correlation
Image
Generation

. Divide video into frames
. Construct tiny frames
. Apply DCT transform on tiny frames
. Binarize DCT results to create corresponding feature vectors
. Construct correlation image CI using feature vectors

Coarser Forgery Line
Detection

. Apply binarization procedure on CI, bCI
. Apply Hough transform on bCI
. Determine the longest line on bCI, l
. Calibrate the end point(Xe, Ye) of the coarser forgery line l

Finer Forgery Line
Localization

. Find the neighboring lines or l through the x and y direction
. Vote the alternative lines using average PSNR
. Choose the line which gives best score as finer forgery line
. Apply shrinking and expanding procedure on forgery line

Figure 2. General outline of the proposed method.

3.1. Correlation image generation
The main goal of this function is to construct a correlation image that represents the similarity between the
frames using brightness values. The function divides the video V into frames F1 , F2 , . . . , Fk and converts them
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into gray scale. Each frame F1 , F2 , · · · , Fk is divided into nonoverlapping 12 × 12 cells. The size of each cell
becomes ⌊N /12⌋ × ⌊M /12⌋ for a frame of size N × M .
Assume that 144 cells for the ith frame Fi are denoted by C1 , C2 , · · · , C144 , where C1 and C144
represent the upper left and lower right cells, respectively. The function calculates average intensity values in
the cells and constructs i th tiny frame T Fi of size 12 × 12 from the cells. Discrete cosine transform (DCT) is
applied to the tiny frame. Then DCT coeﬃcients are binarized according to the phase of the DCT transform.
Binary value 0 is used to represent the DCT coeﬃcients, which have negative values, whereas Binary 1 is used
to denote the other coeﬃcients. After the binarization procedure, the zigzag-scanning procedure is applied to
the binarized 12 × 12 cells to construct binary feature vector Vi of size 1 × 144. Figure 3 shows the tiny frame
generation and binary feature vector construction phase of the proposed method.
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Figure 3. Tiny frame generation and feature construction.

All frames are processed in the same way, and binary feature vectors V1 , V2 , · · · , Vk are created for each
frame. The last step of the “correlation image generation” function is to construct a correlation matrix denoted
by I = {cxy |cxy ∈ [0, 1] , x ∈ 1 · · · k, y ∈ 1 · · · k } , where cxy denotes the correlation value between Vx and Vy .
The matrix CI is represented by the proposed method as a normalized image, where values 0 and 1 correspond
to the least similar and most similar feature vectors, respectively.
We perform an experiment to show the reason for choosing 12 as a cell size during the construction of
the correlation image. Figure 4 indicates the results of the experiment. Sizes 4, 12, 24, and 48 are chosen as
cell sizes, and the created correlation images are given in this figure. When cell size becomes 4, the forgery
line cannot be viewed clearly, as can be seen in Figure 4a. When cell size increases, the forgery line can be
viewed exactly, as can be seen in Figures 4b–4d. However, when we choose cell size to be larger (such as 48),
the running time of the proposed method deteriorates. The main reason for worse running time is the size of
the feature vector. The feature vector for each frame becomes 24 2 and 48 2 for cell sizes 24 and 48, respectively.
Thus, even though larger cell sizes give better forgery lines, we must consider running time performance during
the construction of the algorithm. In this regard, we choose to use 12 as cell size because it gives moderate
forgery line visibility, as can be seen in Figure 4, and better running time performance when compared to larger
cell sizes (24 and 48).
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Figure 4. Diﬀerent sizes of block representation: a) 4 × 4, b) 12 × 12, c) 24 × 24, d) 48 × 48.

3.2. Coarser forgery line detection
The function obtains the correlation image CI as input, and outputs the coarser forgery line. When a malicious
user makes a forgery operation on the video, a line with slope –45 ◦ will appear on CI. Let us assume that frames
10–30 are copied and pasted onto frames 110–130. If the malicious user saves the forged video in uncompressed
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format, CI will contain a line that starts from (10, 110) and ends on (30, 130) with slope –45 ◦ . However, the
attacker will often save the forged video with an encoder. Thus, some eﬀort must be made to find the exact
location of the forgery line. In this work, we apply the coarser-to-finer approach to determine the line. While
the “coarser forgery line detection” function estimates the approximate location of the forgery line, the next
function (Section 3.3) will detect its exact location.
The proposed method extracts the longest line from CI as the first step. The Hough transform is applied
to CI to detect lines with slope –45 ◦ . CI must be binarized before the line detection algorithm is applied. Pixels
on the lower triangular part (the upper triangular part contains the same information) and at the diagonal (they
represent autocorrelation values) are set to zero on CI during binarization, as can be seen in Figure 5. The
region that is restricted by the yellow and blue lines is similarly set to zero, because it contains high correlation
values that are the result of spatially near frames. The width of this region is determined to be 60 by the
proposed method, which assumes that a forgery operation does not occur within two seconds for a video of 30
fps. The other pixel values in CI are binarized to obtain bCI, using threshold value th, and its initial value is
set to 1. If the line detection algorithm, explained below, cannot detect any line on bCI, threshold value th is
decremented by 0.1 and a new bCI is obtained. The threshold value determination process continues until a
line is detected on bCI. The method stops the decrement of th when a line is detected on bCI. The following
steps are applied on bCI by the line detection algorithm to obtain the longest line:

Figure 5. Coarser forgery line detection on CI.

• Apply Hough transform on bCI and return Hough transform matrix H , ρ, and θ values.
• Locate p peaks in H.
• Use peaks p, ρ, and θ values and determine the line segments with minimum length lengthmin .
• Return line l = {(xs , ys ) , (xe , ye )} , which has the maximum length.
The slope of the longest line l , returned by the line detection algorithm, can change in a range (−46◦ , −44◦ ),
because the forged video is recompressed by the malicious user. The start (xs , ys ) and end points (xe , ye ) of
the line are calibrated to give the correct slope, as in Eq. (1). The distance on the x-axis between the start and
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end points of l must be equal to the distance on the y -axis, because the slope must be −45◦ . Assume that the
distance on the x-axis is dx = |xs − xe | and similarly the distance on the y-axis is dy = |ys − ye | .
If (dy /dx ) > 1 ⇒ xe = xe + (dy − dx )

If (dy /dx ) < 1 ⇒ ye = ye − (dx − dy )

(1)

The equation given in (1) updates the start and end points of line l to give the correct slope value−45◦ . Forgery
line l is detected in a coarser manner in this section. The next function will locate the forgery line with higher
precision.
3.3. Finer forgery line localization
In this function, the proposed method locates the forgery line at exact position and returns the index values of
the forged frames. The function gets the coarser forgery line l from the previous function. The first step is to
investigate the exact position of the line. The line l is slid in sequence on the x-axis, and lx1 , lx2 , lx3 lines,
which start from (xs + 1, ys ) , (xs + 2, ys ) , (xs + 3, ys ) , respectively, are obtained. Furthermore, the sliding
operation is realized through the y-axis, and the ly1 , ly2 , ly3 lines are constituted. Figure 6 shows an example
of sliding operation. Frames 10–30 are copied and pasted onto frames 110–130 to create the test video in the
example. The red line represents the forgery line that is the output of the “coarser forgery line detection”
function, whereas blue and yellow lines represent lx1 , lx2 , lx3 and ly1 , ly2 , ly3 , respectively.

Figure 6. Example of a sliding operation.

Points on the line that have integer-valued coordinates correspond to the indexes of the similar frames.
For example, point (10, 110) means that the 10th frame is similar to the 110th frame. The function processes
the lines separately and calculates a score to determine their exact forgery line. The score for each line is
calculated as follows.
3.3.1. Score generation
Peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) values for similar frames, which are represented by the points that have
integer coordinates on the line, are calculated, and the score for the current line is determined to be the average
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of all PSNRs. PSNR for the ith and jth frame Fi and Fj is calculated as in Eq. (2), where Fixy denotes the
pixel values at xth row and yth column of the ith frame.

M SE =

N −1 M −1
)2
1 ∑ ∑ ( xy
Fi − Fjxy
M N x=0 y=0

(
P SN R (Fi , Fj ) = 10log 10

2552
M SE

)
(2)

Figure 7 shows the score generation for each line. The function chooses as forgery line the line that gives
maximum score maxscore . The last part of the “finer forgery line localization” is the shrinking/expanding
procedure. Shrinking/expanding procedure steps are shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 7. Score generation for each line.

3.3.2. Shrinking and expanding procedure
The shrinking procedure investigates the correctness of the start and end points of the forgery line, according
to PSNR values. The procedure that is given below is termed separately for the start and end points of the
forgery line. The values of the start (xs , ys ) and end points (xe , ye ) of the forgery line can be updated with the
shrinking procedure, with which the third parameter determines the shrinking direction. If the third parameter
is ‘S’, the first two parameters correspond to the start point of the line. If the third parameter is ‘E’, the first
two parameters of the function are the end point of the line. The shrinking procedure is shown in Figure 9.
The expanding procedure will be applied according to the result of the shrinking procedure. If one of
the start or end points of the forgery line is not modified by the shrinking procedure, the expanding operation
will be applied, and the forgery line can be modified by the expanding operation. This procedure realizes the
expanding operation in a window w and uses parameter “StartOrEnd ” to determine the expanding direction.
Thus, the expanding procedure is applied from the start position, and a new start position for the line is
determined as in Figure 10. “Finer forgery line localization” function reports the integer points on the forgery
line l = {(xs , ys ) , (xe , ye )} as forged frame numbers.
4. Experimental results
In this section, we conduct experiments to show the eﬀectiveness of the method and compare it to similar
works. The experiments are carried out on a notebook computer with 2.4 GHz dual core i7 processor, running
MATLAB R2014b. Tests are performed on a set of forged videos created with Virtual Dub, an open source
video editor. Randomly picked videos from the Surrey University Library for Forensic Analysis (SULFA) [19]
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Figure 8. Shrinking and expanding procedure steps.

are used to create forged samples. A resolution of 320 × 240 is used to create the test video database. Another
ten forged test videos are generated using movies. Table 1 lists the details of the videos in the current test data
set, which is published at http://ceng2.ktu.edu.tr/%7Egulutas/test database2.zip.
Table 1 indicates the forgery positions for each test video. For example, frames 11–61 are inserted
after the 221st frame in test Video 1 to create a forged video. The test videos after Video 20 are created
using various move files. Randomly chosen frames from a video are copied and inserted into the randomly
chosen positions in the same video during the generation of the test data set, and forged videos are encoded
with open source MPEG-4 (Level 5 Advanced Simple Profile, ASP@L5) algorithm of Xvid codec with Virtual
Dub. We group the experiments into two subsections, eﬀectiveness and comparison tests. The first section
gives an idea about the runtime performance and detection capability under compression for the proposed
method, whereas the second section makes a comparison with similar works using runtime performance and
detection capability metrics. Precision rate (PR), recall rate (RR), and detection accuracy (DA) are evaluated
to compare the method to similar detection methods reported in the literature according to detection capability.
The definitions for PR, RR, and DA are given in Eq. (3), where TP, TN, FP, and FN represent “authentic is
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Figure 9. Shrinking procedure.
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Figure 10. Expanding procedure.

detected as authentic”, “forged is detected as forged”, “authentic is detected as forged”, and “forged is detected
as authentic”, respectively.
PR =

TP
TP + FP

RR =

TP
TP + FN

DA =

TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN

(3)

A method’s performance is satisfactory if it has higher precision and recall values. The total number of detections
is represented by (TP + TN), and (TP + TN + FP + FN) is the total number of frames in the experiment.
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Table 1. Details of the test videos.

Video name
can 220 book
can 220 flap(1)
can 220 flap(2)
can 220 garden(1)
can 220 garden(4)
can 220 man(2)
can 220 road(1)
can 220 road(5)
can 220 room(3)
can 220 street(3)
can 220 street
fuji 2800 busstop(4)
nik s3000 bridge
fuji 2800 outdoor(4)
fuji 2800 road(2)
fuji 2800 road(5)
fuji 2800 stair outdoor
fuji 2800 street(1)
nik s3000 bridge(1)
nik s3000 indoor stairs
Film 1
Film 2
Film 3
Film 4
Film 5
Film 6
Film 7
Film 8
Film 9
Film 10

Frame rate
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
29 fps
30 fps
30 fps
30 fps
30 fps
30 fps
30 fps
30 fps
30 fps
30 fps
29 fps
23 fps
23 fps
29 fps
29 fps
25 fps
25 fps
23 fps
23 fps
25 fps

Forgery operation
11–61 are copied behind 221
101–161 are copied behind 316
61–101 are copied behind 281
11–61 are copied behind 251
101–141 are copied behind 181
11–61 are copied behind 161
151–221 are copied behind 241
131–191 are copied behind 221
131–171 are copied behind 261
31–71 are copied behind 211
86–146 are copied behind 221
6–61 are copied behind 191
11–41 are copied behind 281
31–71 are copied behind 131
6–56 are copied behind 188
61–101 are copied behind 264
41–81 are copied behind 216
111–171 are copied behind 201
121–171 are copied behind 221
11–51 are copied behind 106
166–293 are copied behind 331
235–305 are copied behind 572
1–55 are copied behind 100
233–342 are copied behind 355
459–519 are copied behind 735
65–230 are copied behind 631
571–632 are copied behind 731
895–935 are copied behind 41
0–236 are copied behind 855
0–115 are copied behind 601

Total time (s)
25.5704
27.8090
20.0714
22.1294
22.0051
22.0353
21.9476
23.2352
26.1826
25.2114
25.5235
25.4684
27.9125
25.4200
25.2308
27.8161
27.8127
27.7623
27.9934
27.8080
29.2634
65.6037
11.1669
84.3100
190.5691
83.5779
107.7579
112.6632
188.8240
97.1462

Time (s/frame)
0.0628
0.0648
0.0540
0.0549
0.0610
0.0565
0.0592
0.0653
0.0601
0.0773
0.0606
0.0717
0.0864
0.0820
0.0664
0.0605
0.0752
0.0712
0.0710
0.1220
0.0585
0.0914
0.0634
0.0969
0.1454
0.0955
0.1089
0.1138
0.1530
0.1055

Therefore, higher DA means that the method has a better detection rate. The details of the experiments are
given in the following sections.
4.1. Eﬀectiveness tests
In this section, we give the results of the experiments that were conducted to show the eﬀectiveness of the
proposed method. The first experiment reports the run time performance of the proposed method for all test
videos given in Table 1, which lists the total and per frame execution time for the test videos. For example,
the method reports forgery location for Video 2 within approximately 27.8 s, and the per frame duration for
this video becomes approximately 0.06 s. Test videos given in Table 1 can be grouped into two parts. While
the first 20 videos in Table 1 are created from the videos in the SULFA, the remaining videos are created using
various movie files. The average per frame execution time for the videos in the first part (which are created
using the videos in SULFA) is approximately 0.07 s. This value becomes 0.1 s for the videos in the second part.
Furthermore, we give the DA, PR, and RR values for each video in the test database in Table 2. Average per
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video DA, PR, and RR values in the first part (which are created using the videos in SULFA) is approximately
0.979, 0.995, and 0.978. These values become 1, 0.953, and 0.964 for the videos in the second part.
Table 2. General outline of the proposed method.

Video name
can 220 book
can 220 flap(1)
can 220 flap(2)
can 220 garden(1)
can 220 garden(4)
can 220 man(2)
can 220 road(1)
can 220 road(5)
can 220 room(3)
can 220 street(3)
can 220 street
fuji 2800 busstop(4)
nik s3000 bridge
fuji 2800 outdoor(4)
fuji 2800 road(2)
fuji 2800 road(5)
fuji 2800 stair outdoor
fuji 2800 street(1)
nik s3000 bridge(1)
nik s3000 indoor stairs
Film 1
Film 2
Film 3
Film 4
Film 5
Film 6
Film 7
Film 8
Film 9
Film 10

DA
0.9954
0.9565
0.9946
0.9950
0.9950
0.9950
0.8859
0.9504
0.9954
0.9954
0.9266
1.0000
0.9957
0.9908
0.9954
1.0000
0.9957
0.9391
0.9957
0.9957
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

PR
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.9045
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.9384
0.9965
0.9705
0.9938
0.9834
0.7552
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.8937

RR
0.9940
0.9441
0.9932
0.9934
0.9938
0.9934
0.8502
0.9336
0.9944
0.9944
0.9930
1.0000
0.9950
0.9888
0.9940
1.000
0.9947
0.9235
0.9944
0.9947
0.968
0.9972
0.9886
0.9954
0.9847
0.7988
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.9108

Another experiment shows the detection capability of the proposed method when the test videos are reencoded after forgery operation. The last ten test videos given in Table 1 are re-encoded using various quality
factors (QF), such as 1, 15, and 31, where 31 indicates the best compression ratio. DA, PR, and RR values are
measured with these compressed test videos to show the robustness of the method against recompression.
Figure 11 indicates that the proposed method has approximately 1 and 0.996 values for DA, PR, and RR,
respectively, when the forged video is resaved without any compression. If the forged test videos given in Table
1 are resaved with QF = 31 after forgery operation, DA, PR, and RR become 1, 0.953, and 0.964, respectively.
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Figure 11 indicates that although DA value never changes, PR and RR values decrease when compression ratio
increases. However, the method can detect forged videos with PR = 0.95 and RR = 0.96, even if the forged
videos have been resaved QF = 31.
4.2. Comparison tests
In this section, we give the comparison results according to execution time and detection capability. The first
experiment gives the average execution time for the proposed method and the other, as can be seen in Table
3. The average execution time results for the methods indicate that the proposed method can detect forgery
operations on the test videos with less time. While the average per frame execution time for the methods in
[1–4] is approximately 294.6, 140.6, 0.4, and 0.063, the proposed method can detect forgery operation on a
frame within 0.07 s. Enhancing per frame execution time in video processing is important, because test videos
can accommodate many frames, especially when surveillance videos are considered. Another experiment gives
comparison results for the methods when their detection capabilities are considered. Figure 12 shows PR, RR,
and DA values for the proposed method and other [1–4] for test videos given in Table 2. While the methods
in [1–4] have approximately 0.3, 0.82, 0.94, and 0.98 PRs, respectively, the proposed method gives PR = 1.
Moreover, recall rates and detection accuracy results indicate the superiority of the work compared to similar
works.
1.2000
1.0000
0.8000
0.6000
0.4000
0.2000
0.0000

DA-PR-RR

1.02
1
0.98
0.96
0.94
0.92
Uncompressed

1-QF
DA

PR

15-QF

DA PR RR

0.5915

0.6901

DA

RR

Figure 11. Detection capability of the proposed method
according to diﬀerent quality factors.

0.9864
0.9812

0.9735

0.3010

Wang et al.[1]

31-QF

0.9776
0.9473
0.8697
0.8278
0.8547
0.8669
0.8445
0.7910
0.8035

Lin et al.[2]

PR

Yang et al.[3] Guzin et al.[4]

Proposed
Method

RR

Figure 12. Comparison results according to detection
capability.

Table 3. Tiny frame generation and feature construction.

Method
Wang et al. [1]
Lin et al. [2]
Yang et al. [3]
Guzin et al. [4]
Proposed method

Execution time (s/frame)
294.67
140.60
0.41
0.063
0.07

5. Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a new video forgery detection approach. The method extracts binarized DCT features
from the frames and represents the similarity between them to be a correlation image. Elements of the correlation
image give an idea about the similarity between corresponding frames. The method then investigates a line
called forgery line on the correlation image, to determine the location of the forgery line in a coarser manner.
The Hough transform is applied to the image to determine the location of the line. Furthermore, the proposed
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method suggests two new procedures, shrinking and expanding, to locate the forgery line in a finer manner.
The integer-valued points on the line indicate the corresponding index values of forged frames. Comparison
and eﬀectiveness tests, given in the experimental result section, show that the proposed method gives better
execution time than [1–3] and better detection capability when compared to similar works [1–4].
The main diﬃculty in the frame duplication detection literature is to develop new methods that are
resistant to compression attacks. Only one work in the literature considers this issue in their results [4]. Our
results indicate that the proposed method gives better detection performance when compared to [4] under
compression attacks. Finally, we aim to improve our method against frame mirroring attacks in our future
work.
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